Hinman/Bowen Squabble over words about existence of God, Affirmative rebuttal

Hinman's words in blue
II. HINMAN’S REPLIES TO MY OBJECTIONS TO REMEC
A. POSTS IN THIS DEBATE THAT DISCUSS REMEC:
Joe Hinman’s REMEC Argument for God
My Criticism of Hinman’s REMEC Argument for God
Joe Hinman’s Responses to My Criticism of His REMEC Argument

B. MY THREE MAIN OBJECTIONS TO REMEC
OBJECTION #1:
Neither God nor existence are mentioned ANYWHERE in REMEC.
I answered it by showing the top of the page where I introduced the argument uses the terns God and alludes to argument for God's reality my way of saying existence I made that clear too),

OBJECTION #2:
The central concept of REMEC (i.e. “religious experience”) is left UNDEFINED and VERY UNCLEAR.
The whole first 1/3 of the speech is about why it's totally clear, and well defined in 200 academic studies in peer reviewed journals in a huge boy of works spaning 50 years. Notice he says nothing about this.


OBJECTION #3:
The contents of the key epistemic criteria upon which REMEC is based are left UNSPECIFIED.
typical of his prevarication,I specified them every time i talked about them, that would be the regular,consistent shared and navigation, he's also misrepresenting the kind of criteria they are,


C. HINMAN’S REPLIES TO MY OBJECTION #1
Hinman has nothing intelligent to say in reply to my Objection #1.
So, I will simply re-state the objection in a way that even a child could understand.

I even put the answer in large letters it said God across the top of the page, that doesn't require much intelligence Brad just eye sight,
Hinman’s REMEC Argument:
(1) we trust perceptions that work for us in navigating the world
(2) we judge by criteria Regular, Consistent, Shared (inter-subjective)
(3) RE fits this criteria
(4 ) enables “navigation” (the point of the criteria) 
(5) :. we are warranted to trust RE as indicative
The conclusion of this argument is claim (5):
  • There is NO MENTION OF GOD in claim (5).
It says God across the top of the page, this is the criteria you said inever furnished,


Claims (1) through (4) are the premises of the REMEC argument:
  • There is NO MENTION OF GOD in claim (1).
  • There is NO MENTION OF GOD in claim (2).
  • There is NO MENTION OF GOD in claim (3).
  • There is NO MENTION OF GOD in claim (4).
Now I will draw an inference that even a child could understand and follow:
There is NO MENTION OF GOD ANYWHERE in the REMEC argument.

except across the top of the page where it says this is what this is about. That ridiculous to expect it to say God after every sentence when it says at the top this is all about God. how puerile
The REMEC argument is about “religious experience”; it is NOT an argument about God, and therefore it is NOT an argument about the existence of God.

At this point he;s merely obfuscating,  it;s experience of God thus the experience warrants belief, I pointed all of this out before,
NOTE:
If Hinman had provided an actual definition of “religious experience”, he could have defined it as an “experience that seems to the experiencer to be of the presence or activity of God.”  (I believe William Alston has a definition along those lines).  In that way, he could have linked the concept of “religious experience” directly to the concept of “God”. I would have objected to such a definition, but it would have at least created a logical connection between claim (5) and the issue of the existence of God. But Hinman failed to provide a legitimate definition of “religious experience”, so no such conceptual connection was established.


Again totally ignores the fact that I did provide the definition several times,I also spent almost half the speech talking about how the definition is accepted and understood in the whole psychology of religion,

D. HINMAN’S REPLIES TO MY OBJECTION #2
REPLY #1:
No, first of all I said religious experience (RE) is the umbrella term.
Saying that “religious experience” is an “umbrella term” fails to clarify the meaning of this phrase.

Obviously that was not the entire thing, Einstein,  just clarification because you got it wrong!,

 Hinman considers “mystical experience” to be one kind of “religious experience” and that there are other kinds of “religious experience”. I am aware of that, and my objection showed that I was aware of that. But that does almost nothing to define the term “religious experience”.

Bright boy but not bright enough to answer the argument the fact remains I did define mystical experience and I did so with documentation,
REPLY #2:
Secondly, the charge that I’m being unclear is empirically disproved because there is a huge body of academic work from which I researched to write my book.
This is completely irrelevant. Even if we grant the assumption that “there is a huge body of academic work” that is considered in Hinman’s book, this has no relevance to the clarity or lack of clarity in his blog post where he presents the REMEC argument.

Yes it sure as hell does because I quoted several piece so evidence talking about the definition, I said undifferentiated unity and sense of the numinous I made taht quite clear, at top where I defined terms i said: ME: Mystical experience generally understood as defined by Stace as a state of consciousness embodying the state of undifferentiated unity,and sense of the numinous but not visions or voices.


 Hinman’s book might be filled with dozens of crystal clear arguments and definitions, but that doesn’t show that his blog post is clear, and it certainly does not in any way show that he clearly defined the key concept in REMEC (which is “religious experience”) in his blog posts in this debate.

I defined them at teh top of the page,including mystical
REPLY #3:
Bowen refers to the problem of other kinds of experiences being called RE, yes that is why I called RE an “umbrella term” but ME (mystical experience)is very specific and clear. It’s clear in it’s definition we know exactly what is produced and how to determine a valid mystical experience.
Hinman then quotes various definitions and explanations of the term “mystical experience”. This is, once again, irrelevant to my objection, which is that the phrase “religious experience” is the key concept in the REMEC argument, and that Hinman failed to clearly define what this phrase means. The conclusion of the REMEC argument is this:

No, religious is a general term that catches several specific types, mystical is what most of the data is based upon, that's why it;s called the m scale: or mysticism scale. My argumemt includes more than just mystical but it is included, that's the specificity you need on the term RE.  That should be clear enough, It's just a catch all term.

(5) :. we are warranted to trust RE as indicative
There is no mention of “mystical experience” in the conclusion of REMEC. The conclusion is NOT about “mystical experience”; it is about “RE” which is an abbreviation for “religious experience”. Therefore, this argument is about “religious experience”, but Hinman failed to provide a clear definition of this key concept. Hinman literally does not know what he is talking about.

Wrong. Mystical part of RE what;s true of RE in this regard is true of mystical.
Hinman’s replies above to my objection are all irrelevant to the objection. Saying that “religious experience” is an “umbrella term” fails to provide any significant information about what this phrase means. The alleged massive academic content and merits of 

His answer gives away that he knows what it means I said clearly it is an umbrella term it  includes mystical and born again that is all you need to know;m that's what RE is in that   sentence it;s a reference to general experiences like mystical and born again,

this is Bowen's special little trick isn't it splitting hairs over words,




Hinman has completely failed to provide a relevant reply to my Objection #2.
E. HINMAN’S REPLY TO MY OBJECTION #3:
====================
The criteria is what we use to determine the reliability of our experiences and perceptions, Thomas Reid suggests that criteria, true he does not use the phrases “regular,” “constant.” and “shared,” but the process he describes is best summarize in that way,he gives three examples:
(1)A solider on the battlefield notices all those stuck with bayonets tend to die so he does not ask bunch of Cartesian questions about reality while waiting to be stabbed he get’s out of the way;
(2) A man making love to a woman does not stop in the middle to quiz her about the reality of her existence,
(3) Common people living their lives going about their tasks don’t refrain from putting bread on the table until they they sort out the epistemology,even Descartes waited for retirement.
=========================
Examples are often helpful in explaining or clarifying a general principle, but it is very sad that Hinman takes the giving of these three examples to be sufficient to specify the content of his three key epistemic principles. This illustrates the unclarity and confusion that buzzes around inside of Hinman’s head.

I set out the criteria and he has refereed it more than once,that is the definition that is the criteria,he has no argument to show it's not enough. He just repeats the same misconception. 

I specified the content and made quote clear i derived it from Reid's major point, of which the three examples are merely illustration. I made that quite clear,
Providing one example of a principle doesn’t even come close to specifying the actual contents of the principle. 

The Proterozoic is habitually used by us in the way we grasp epistemic realty that is  what Reid says, Bowing has no response for that, trying to make it seem like it needs more is just a ruse,because he has no answer. Another version of saying it;s unclear it;'s really saying I can't answer this.

The fact that Hinman confuses the giving of an example with the clear statement of an epistemic principle is, by itself, sufficient to firmly establish the correctness of my Objection #3.  Given that the above UNCLEAR CRAP is what we get when Hinman has a second opportunity to clearly state his key epistemic principles, I strongly suspect that Hinman is not intellectually sophisticated enough to provide a clear statement of any epistemic principle.

That is irresponsible and unresponsive, The Reid literatuermmwihcI linkiedto aqnd quoted at length provides all the epistemoc primciple we need, the crteriaiosspeodifoic abojt wat we lookfor so whyshouldweneedanyore,kI expalined atlength too:


Matty says:

Thomas Reid
Theory of Knowledge lecture notes.
G.J. Mattey
Philosophy, UC Davis
"Consider the question whether we are justified in believing that a physical world exists. As David Hume pointed out, the skepticism generated by philosophical arguments is contrary to our natural inclination to believe that there are physical objects." "[T]he skeptic . . . must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, tho' he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteem'd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?, but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasoning." (A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section II)

"Nonetheless, after considering the causes of our belief in the existence of body and finding them inadequate for the justification of that belief, Hume admitted to be drawn away form his orignal assumption that bodies exist. 'To be ingenuous, I feel myself at present . . . more inclin'd to repose no faith at all in my senses, or rather imagination, than to place in it such an implicit confidence,' because ''tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses." His solution to these doubts was "carelessness and in-attention,' which divert the mind from skeptical arguments."[13]
"Thomas Reid, who was a later contemporary of Hume's, claimed that our beliefs in the external world are justified.'I shall take it for granted that the evidence of sense, when the proper circumstances concur, is good evidence, and a just ground of belief' (Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay IV, Chapter XX). This evidence is different from that of reasoning from premises to a conclusion, however." "Such original and natural judgments [based on sense-experience] are, therefore, a part of that furniture which Nature hath given to the human understanding. They are the inspiration of the Almighty, no less than our notions or simple apprehensions. They serve to direct us in the common affairs of life, where our reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark. They are part of our constitution; and all the discoveries of our reason are grounded upon them. They make up what is called the common sense of mankind; and, what is manifestly contrary to any of those first principles, is what we call absurd. (An Inquiry into the Human Mind, Chapter VII, Section 4)"


"One might say that judgments from sense-experience they are justified insofar as they justify other beliefs we have, or perhaps because they are the output of a perceptual system designed by God to convey the truth. (Of course, if the latter is what gives these beliefs their justification, the claim that we are designed in this way needs to be justified as well.)"[14] 
Obviously I'm connecting perceptions to a source of sense experience and reflects upon RE as another source of sense experience.
Somehow he seems to have missed the fact that I first establish a criteria then I talk about how RE fist the criteria. The criteria is what we use to determine the reliability of our experiences and perceptions, Thomas Reid suggests that criteria, true he does not use the phrases "regular," "constant." and "shared," but the process he describes is best summarize in that way,he gives three examples:
(1)A solider on the battlefield notices all those stuck with bayonets tend to die so he does not ask bunch of Cartesian questions about reality while waiting to be stabbed he get's out of the way;
(2) A man making love to a woman does not stop in the middle to quiz her about the reality of her existence,
(3) Common people living their lives going about their tasks don't refrain from putting bread on the table until they they sort out the epistemology,even Descartes waited for retirement.


Hinman’s pathetic second attempt at specifying the content of his key epistemic criteria shows that the answer to the question “Where’s the beef?” is: There ain’t any beef here!  Underneath all the bullshit that Hinman spews in the REMEC argument is just more bullshit, more confusion, more unclarity.

*Never does he make  specific arguments to my  criteria to show they are wrong.

*never does he deny that we use the criteria in assessing experiences

*Nor does he address any of the things I quote from Matty or Reid, why don't those provide the background we need for the argument? he has no idea,

HE IS UNCLEAR!!!
All three of my main objections to REMEC stand firm, and each one is sufficient by itself to justify my view that REMEC was Dead On Arrival, and that REMEC is not merely a defective argument, but is an argument that is not worthy of serious consideration.

they are horse shit, they based upon his poor reading skills and his ironing of my arguments,

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